Merge branch 'master' into threading

This commit is contained in:
Dennis Schwerdel 2021-01-29 19:33:16 +01:00
commit 1eb1771d2a
13 changed files with 683 additions and 263 deletions

344
Cargo.lock generated
View File

@ -32,6 +32,12 @@ dependencies = [
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@ -68,6 +86,15 @@ version = "1.0.1"
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@ -441,6 +670,31 @@ dependencies = [
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View File

@ -33,12 +33,17 @@ smallvec = "1.6"
[dev-dependencies]
tempfile = "3"
criterion = "0.3"
[features]
default = ["nat"]
bench = []
nat = ["igd"]
[[bench]]
name = "bench"
harness = false
[profile.release]
lto = true

149
benches/bench.rs Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
#![allow(dead_code, unused_macros, unused_imports)]
#[macro_use] extern crate serde;
#[macro_use] extern crate log;
use criterion::{criterion_group, criterion_main, Criterion, Throughput};
use smallvec::smallvec;
use ring::aead;
use std::str::FromStr;
use std::net::{SocketAddr, Ipv4Addr, SocketAddrV4, UdpSocket};
mod util {
include!("../src/util.rs");
}
mod error {
include!("../src/error.rs");
}
mod payload {
include!("../src/payload.rs");
}
mod types {
include!("../src/types.rs");
}
mod table {
include!("../src/table.rs");
}
mod crypto_core {
include!("../src/crypto/core.rs");
}
pub use error::Error;
use util::{MockTimeSource, MsgBuffer};
use types::{Address, Range};
use table::{ClaimTable};
use payload::{Packet, Frame, Protocol};
use crypto_core::{create_dummy_pair, EXTRA_LEN};
fn udp_send(c: &mut Criterion) {
let sock = UdpSocket::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap();
let data = [0; 1400];
let addr = SocketAddrV4::new(Ipv4Addr::new(127, 0, 0, 1), 1);
let mut g = c.benchmark_group("udp_send");
g.throughput(Throughput::Bytes(1400));
g.bench_function("udp_send", |b| {
b.iter(|| sock.send_to(&data, &addr).unwrap());
});
g.finish();
}
fn decode_ipv4(c: &mut Criterion) {
let data = [0x40, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 192, 168, 1, 1, 192, 168, 1, 2];
let mut g = c.benchmark_group("payload");
g.throughput(Throughput::Bytes(1400));
g.bench_function("decode_ipv4", |b| {
b.iter(|| Packet::parse(&data).unwrap());
});
g.finish();
}
fn decode_ipv6(c: &mut Criterion) {
let data = [
0x60, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 0, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 6, 5,
4, 3, 2, 1
];
let mut g = c.benchmark_group("payload");
g.throughput(Throughput::Bytes(1400));
g.bench_function("decode_ipv6", |b| {
b.iter(|| Packet::parse(&data).unwrap());
});
g.finish();
}
fn decode_ethernet(c: &mut Criterion) {
let data = [6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8];
let mut g = c.benchmark_group("payload");
g.throughput(Throughput::Bytes(1400));
g.bench_function("decode_ethernet", |b| {
b.iter(|| Frame::parse(&data).unwrap());
});
g.finish();
}
fn decode_ethernet_with_vlan(c: &mut Criterion) {
let data = [6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 0x81, 0, 4, 210, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8];
let mut g = c.benchmark_group("payload");
g.throughput(Throughput::Bytes(1400));
g.bench_function("decode_ethernet_with_vlan", |b| {
b.iter(|| Frame::parse(&data).unwrap());
});
g.finish();
}
fn lookup_warm(c: &mut Criterion) {
let mut table = ClaimTable::<MockTimeSource>::new(60, 60);
let addr = Address::from_str("1.2.3.4").unwrap();
table.cache(addr, SocketAddr::from_str("1.2.3.4:3210").unwrap());
let mut g = c.benchmark_group("table");
g.throughput(Throughput::Bytes(1400));
g.bench_function("lookup_warm", |b| {
b.iter(|| table.lookup(addr));
});
g.finish();
}
fn lookup_cold(c: &mut Criterion) {
let mut table = ClaimTable::<MockTimeSource>::new(60, 60);
let addr = Address::from_str("1.2.3.4").unwrap();
table.set_claims(SocketAddr::from_str("1.2.3.4:3210").unwrap(), smallvec![Range::from_str("1.2.3.4/32").unwrap()]);
let mut g = c.benchmark_group("table");
g.throughput(Throughput::Bytes(1400));
g.bench_function("lookup_cold", |b| {
b.iter(|| {
table.clear_cache();
table.lookup(addr)
});
});
g.finish();
}
fn crypto_bench(c: &mut Criterion, algo: &'static aead::Algorithm) {
let mut buffer = MsgBuffer::new(EXTRA_LEN);
buffer.set_length(1400);
let (mut sender, mut receiver) = create_dummy_pair(algo);
let mut g = c.benchmark_group("crypto");
g.throughput(Throughput::Bytes(2*1400));
g.bench_function(format!("{:?}", algo), |b| {
b.iter(|| {
sender.encrypt(&mut buffer);
receiver.decrypt(&mut buffer).unwrap();
});
});
g.finish()
}
fn crypto_chacha20(c: &mut Criterion) {
crypto_bench(c, &aead::CHACHA20_POLY1305)
}
fn crypto_aes128(c: &mut Criterion) {
crypto_bench(c, &aead::AES_128_GCM)
}
fn crypto_aes256(c: &mut Criterion) {
crypto_bench(c, &aead::AES_256_GCM)
}
criterion_group!(benches, udp_send, decode_ipv4, decode_ipv6, decode_ethernet, decode_ethernet_with_vlan, lookup_cold, lookup_warm, crypto_chacha20, crypto_aes128, crypto_aes256);
criterion_main!(benches);

View File

@ -1,41 +1,41 @@
//! This module implements a crypto core for encrypting and decrypting message streams
//!
//! The crypto core only encrypts and decrypts messages, using given keys. Negotiating and rotating the keys is out of
//! scope of the crypto core. The crypto core assumes that the remote node will always have the necessary key to decrypt
//! the message.
//!
//! The crypto core encrypts messages in place, writes some extra data (key id and nonce) into a given space and
//! includes the given header data in the authentication tag. When decrypting messages, the crypto core reads the extra
//! data, uses the key id to find the right key to decrypting the message and then decrypts the message, using the given
//! nonce and including the given header data in the verification of the authentication tag.
//!
//! While the core only uses a single key at a time for encrypting messages, it is ready to decrypt messages based on
//! one of 4 stored keys (the encryption key being one of them). An external key rotation is responsible for adding the
//! key to the remote peer before switching to the key on the local peer for encryption.
//!
//! As mentioned, the encryption and decryption works in place. Therefore the parameter payload_and_tag contains (when
//! decrypting) or provides space for (when encrypting) the payload and the authentication tag. When encrypting, that
//! means, that the last TAG_LEN bytes of payload_and_tag must be reserved for the tag and must not contain payload
//! bytes.
//!
//! The nonce is a value of 12 bytes (192 bits). Since both nodes can use the same key for encryption, the most
//! significant byte (msb) of the nonce is initialized differently on both peers: one peer uses the value 0x00 and the
//! other one 0x80. That means that the nonce space is essentially divided in two halves, one for each node.
//!
//! To save space and keep the encrypted data aligned to 64 bits, not all bytes of the nonce are transferred. Instead,
//! only 7 bytes are included in messages (another byte is used for the key id, hence 64 bit alignment). The rest of the
//! nonce is deduced by the nodes: All other bytes are assumed to be 0x00, except for the most significant byte, which
//! is assumed to be the opposite ones own msb. This has two nice effects:
//! 1) Long before the nonce could theoretically repeat, the messages can no longer be decrypted by the peer as the
//! higher bytes are no longer zero as assumed.
//! 2) By deducing the msb to be the opposite of ones own msb, it is no longer possible for an attacker to redirect a
//! message back to the sender because then the assumed nonce will be wrong and the message fails to decrypt. Otherwise,
//! this could lead to problems as nodes would be able to accidentally decrypt their own messages.
//!
//! In order to be resistent against replay attacks but allow for reordering of messages, the crypto core uses nonce
//! pinning. For every active key, the biggest nonce seen so far is being tracked. Every second, the biggest nonce seen
//! one second ago plus 1 becomes the minimum nonce that is accepted for that key. That means, that reordering can
//! happen within one second but after a second, old messages will not be accepted anymore.
// This module implements a crypto core for encrypting and decrypting message streams
//
// The crypto core only encrypts and decrypts messages, using given keys. Negotiating and rotating the keys is out of
// scope of the crypto core. The crypto core assumes that the remote node will always have the necessary key to decrypt
// the message.
//
// The crypto core encrypts messages in place, writes some extra data (key id and nonce) into a given space and
// includes the given header data in the authentication tag. When decrypting messages, the crypto core reads the extra
// data, uses the key id to find the right key to decrypting the message and then decrypts the message, using the given
// nonce and including the given header data in the verification of the authentication tag.
//
// While the core only uses a single key at a time for encrypting messages, it is ready to decrypt messages based on
// one of 4 stored keys (the encryption key being one of them). An external key rotation is responsible for adding the
// key to the remote peer before switching to the key on the local peer for encryption.
//
// As mentioned, the encryption and decryption works in place. Therefore the parameter payload_and_tag contains (when
// decrypting) or provides space for (when encrypting) the payload and the authentication tag. When encrypting, that
// means, that the last TAG_LEN bytes of payload_and_tag must be reserved for the tag and must not contain payload
// bytes.
//
// The nonce is a value of 12 bytes (192 bits). Since both nodes can use the same key for encryption, the most
// significant byte (msb) of the nonce is initialized differently on both peers: one peer uses the value 0x00 and the
// other one 0x80. That means that the nonce space is essentially divided in two halves, one for each node.
//
// To save space and keep the encrypted data aligned to 64 bits, not all bytes of the nonce are transferred. Instead,
// only 7 bytes are included in messages (another byte is used for the key id, hence 64 bit alignment). The rest of the
// nonce is deduced by the nodes: All other bytes are assumed to be 0x00, except for the most significant byte, which
// is assumed to be the opposite ones own msb. This has two nice effects:
// 1) Long before the nonce could theoretically repeat, the messages can no longer be decrypted by the peer as the
// higher bytes are no longer zero as assumed.
// 2) By deducing the msb to be the opposite of ones own msb, it is no longer possible for an attacker to redirect a
// message back to the sender because then the assumed nonce will be wrong and the message fails to decrypt. Otherwise,
// this could lead to problems as nodes would be able to accidentally decrypt their own messages.
//
// In order to be resistent against replay attacks but allow for reordering of messages, the crypto core uses nonce
// pinning. For every active key, the biggest nonce seen so far is being tracked. Every second, the biggest nonce seen
// one second ago plus 1 becomes the minimum nonce that is accepted for that key. That means, that reordering can
// happen within one second but after a second, old messages will not be accepted anymore.
use byteorder::{ReadBytesExt, WriteBytesExt};
use ring::{
@ -467,37 +467,3 @@ mod tests {
assert!(speed > 10.0);
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "bench")]
mod benches {
use super::*;
use test::Bencher;
fn crypto_bench(b: &mut Bencher, algo: &'static aead::Algorithm) {
let mut buffer = MsgBuffer::new(EXTRA_LEN);
buffer.set_length(1400);
let (mut sender, mut receiver) = create_dummy_pair(algo);
b.iter(|| {
sender.encrypt(&mut buffer);
receiver.decrypt(&mut buffer).unwrap();
});
b.bytes = 1400;
}
#[bench]
fn crypto_chacha20(b: &mut Bencher) {
crypto_bench(b, &aead::CHACHA20_POLY1305)
}
#[bench]
fn crypto_aes128(b: &mut Bencher) {
crypto_bench(b, &aead::AES_128_GCM)
}
#[bench]
fn crypto_aes256(b: &mut Bencher) {
crypto_bench(b, &aead::AES_256_GCM)
}
}

View File

@ -1,54 +1,54 @@
//! This module implements a 3-way handshake to initialize an authenticated and encrypted connection.
//!
//! The handshake assumes that each node has a asymmetric Curve 25519 key pair as well as a list of trusted public keys
//! and a set of supported crypto algorithms as well as the expected speed when using them. If successful, the handshake
//! will negotiate a crypto algorithm to use and a common ephemeral symmetric key and exchange a given payload between
//! the nodes.
//!
//! The handshake consists of 3 stages, "ping", "pong" and "peng". In the following description, the node that initiates
//! the connection is named "A" and the other node is named "B". Since a lot of things are going on in parallel in the
//! handshake, those aspects are described separately in the following paragraphs.
//!
//! Every message contains the node id of the sender. If a node receives a message with its own node id, it just ignores
//! it and closes the connection. This is the way nodes avoid to connect to themselves as it is not trivial for a node
//! to know its own addresses (especially in the case of NAT).
//!
//! All initialization messages are signed by the asymmetric key of the sender. Also the messages indicate the public
//! key being used, so the receiver can use the correct public key to verify the signature. The public key itself is not
//! attached to the message for privacy reasons (the public key is stable over multiple restarts while the node id is
//! only valid for a single run). Instead, a 2 byte salt value as well as the last 2 bytes of the salted sha 2 hash of
//! the public key are used to identify the public key. This way, a receiver that trusts this public key can identify
//! it but a random observer can't. If the public key is unknown or the signature can't be verified, the message is
//! ignored.
//!
//! Every message contains a byte that specifies the stage (ping = 1, pong = 2, peng = 3). If a message with an
//! unexpected stage is received, it is ignored and the last message that has been sent is repeated. There is only one
//! exception to this rule: if a "pong" message is expected, but a "ping" message is received instead AND the node id of
//! the sender is greater than the node id of the receiver, the receiving node will reset its state and assume the role
//! of a receiver of the initialization (i.e. "B"). This is used to "negotiate" the roles A and B when both nodes
//! initiate the connection in parallel and think they are A.
//!
//! Upon connection creation, both nodes create a random ephemeral ECDH key pair and exchange the public keys in the
//! ping and pong messages. A sends the ping message to B containing A's public key and B replies with a pong message
//! containing B's public key. That means, that after receiving the ping message B can calculate the shared key material
//! and after receiving the pong message A can calculate the shared key material.
//!
//! The ping message and the pong message contain a set of supported crypto algorithms together with the estimated
//! speeds of the algorithms. When B receives a ping message, or A receives a pong message, it can combine this
//! information with its own algorithm list and select the algorithm with the best expected speed for the crypto core.
//!
//! The pong and peng message contain the payload that the nodes want to exchange in the initialization phase apart from
//! the cryptographic initialization. This payload is encoded according to the application and encrypted using the key
//! material and the crypto algorithm that have been negotiated via the ping and pong messages. The pong message,
//! therefore contains information to set up symmetric encryption as well as a part that is already encrypted.
//!
//! The handshake ends for A after sending the peng message and for B after receiving this message. At this time both
//! nodes initialize the connection using the payload and enter normal operation. The negotiated crypto core is used for
//! future communication and the key rotation is started. Since the peng message can be lost, A needs to keep the
//! initialization state in order to repeat a lost peng message. After one second, A removes that state.
//!
//! Once every second, both nodes check whether they have already finished the initialization. If not, they repeat their
//! last message. After 5 seconds, the initialization is aborted as failed.
// This module implements a 3-way handshake to initialize an authenticated and encrypted connection.
//
// The handshake assumes that each node has a asymmetric Curve 25519 key pair as well as a list of trusted public keys
// and a set of supported crypto algorithms as well as the expected speed when using them. If successful, the handshake
// will negotiate a crypto algorithm to use and a common ephemeral symmetric key and exchange a given payload between
// the nodes.
//
// The handshake consists of 3 stages, "ping", "pong" and "peng". In the following description, the node that initiates
// the connection is named "A" and the other node is named "B". Since a lot of things are going on in parallel in the
// handshake, those aspects are described separately in the following paragraphs.
//
// Every message contains the node id of the sender. If a node receives a message with its own node id, it just ignores
// it and closes the connection. This is the way nodes avoid to connect to themselves as it is not trivial for a node
// to know its own addresses (especially in the case of NAT).
//
// All initialization messages are signed by the asymmetric key of the sender. Also the messages indicate the public
// key being used, so the receiver can use the correct public key to verify the signature. The public key itself is not
// attached to the message for privacy reasons (the public key is stable over multiple restarts while the node id is
// only valid for a single run). Instead, a 2 byte salt value as well as the last 2 bytes of the salted sha 2 hash of
// the public key are used to identify the public key. This way, a receiver that trusts this public key can identify
// it but a random observer can't. If the public key is unknown or the signature can't be verified, the message is
// ignored.
//
// Every message contains a byte that specifies the stage (ping = 1, pong = 2, peng = 3). If a message with an
// unexpected stage is received, it is ignored and the last message that has been sent is repeated. There is only one
// exception to this rule: if a "pong" message is expected, but a "ping" message is received instead AND the node id of
// the sender is greater than the node id of the receiver, the receiving node will reset its state and assume the role
// of a receiver of the initialization (i.e. "B"). This is used to "negotiate" the roles A and B when both nodes
// initiate the connection in parallel and think they are A.
//
// Upon connection creation, both nodes create a random ephemeral ECDH key pair and exchange the public keys in the
// ping and pong messages. A sends the ping message to B containing A's public key and B replies with a pong message
// containing B's public key. That means, that after receiving the ping message B can calculate the shared key material
// and after receiving the pong message A can calculate the shared key material.
//
// The ping message and the pong message contain a set of supported crypto algorithms together with the estimated
// speeds of the algorithms. When B receives a ping message, or A receives a pong message, it can combine this
// information with its own algorithm list and select the algorithm with the best expected speed for the crypto core.
//
// The pong and peng message contain the payload that the nodes want to exchange in the initialization phase apart from
// the cryptographic initialization. This payload is encoded according to the application and encrypted using the key
// material and the crypto algorithm that have been negotiated via the ping and pong messages. The pong message,
// therefore contains information to set up symmetric encryption as well as a part that is already encrypted.
//
// The handshake ends for A after sending the peng message and for B after receiving this message. At this time both
// nodes initialize the connection using the payload and enter normal operation. The negotiated crypto core is used for
// future communication and the key rotation is started. Since the peng message can be lost, A needs to keep the
// initialization state in order to repeat a lost peng message. After one second, A removes that state.
//
// Once every second, both nodes check whether they have already finished the initialization. If not, they repeat their
// last message. After 5 seconds, the initialization is aborted as failed.
use super::{

View File

@ -252,6 +252,7 @@ impl PeerCrypto {
}
fn decrypt_message(&mut self, buffer: &mut MsgBuffer) -> Result<(), Error> {
// HOT PATH
if let Some(core) = &mut self.core {
core.decrypt(buffer)
} else {
@ -260,17 +261,21 @@ impl PeerCrypto {
}
pub fn handle_message(&mut self, buffer: &mut MsgBuffer) -> Result<MessageResult, Error> {
// HOT PATH
if buffer.is_empty() {
return Err(Error::InvalidCryptoState("No message in buffer"))
}
if is_init_message(buffer.buffer()) {
// COLD PATH
debug!("Received init message");
self.handle_init_message(buffer)
} else {
// HOT PATH
debug!("Received encrypted message");
self.decrypt_message(buffer)?;
let msg_type = buffer.take_prefix();
if msg_type == MESSAGE_TYPE_ROTATION {
// COLD PATH
debug!("Received rotation message");
self.handle_rotate_message(buffer.buffer())?;
buffer.clear();
@ -282,6 +287,7 @@ impl PeerCrypto {
}
pub fn send_message(&mut self, type_: u8, buffer: &mut MsgBuffer) {
// HOT PATH
assert_ne!(type_, MESSAGE_TYPE_ROTATION);
buffer.prepend_byte(type_);
self.encrypt_message(buffer);

View File

@ -1,29 +1,29 @@
//! This module implements a turn based key rotation.
//!
//! The main idea is that both peers periodically create ecdh key pairs and exchange their public keys to create
//! common key material. There are always two separate ecdh handshakes going on: one initiated by each peer.
//! However, one handshake is always one step ahead of the other. That means that every message being sent contains a
//! public key from step 1 of the handshake "proposed key" and a public key from step 2 of the handshake "confirmed
//! key" (all messages except first message).
//!
//! When receiving a message from the peer, the node will create a new ecdh key pair and perform the key
//! calculation for the proposed key. The peer will store the public key for the confirmation as pending to be
//! confirmed in the next cycle. Also, if the message contains a confirmation (all but the very first message do),
//! the node will use the stored private key to perform the ecdh key calculation and emit that key to be used in
//! the crypto stream.
//!
//! Upon each cycle, a node first checks if it still has a proposed key that has not been confirmed by the remote
//! peer. If so, a message must have been lost and the whole last message including the proposed key as well as the
//! last confirmed key is being resent. If no proposed key is stored, the node will create a new ecdh key pair, and
//! store the private key as proposed key. It then sends out a message containing the public key as proposal, as
//! well as confirming the pending key. This key is also emitted to be added to the crypto stream but not to be
//! used for encrypting.
//!
//! Monotonically increasing message ids guard the communication from message duplication and also serve as
//! identifiers for the keys to be used in the crypto stream. Since the keys are rotating, the last 2 bits of the
//! id are enough to identify the key.
//!
//! The whole communication is sent via the crypto stream and is therefore encrypted and protected against tampering.
// This module implements a turn based key rotation.
//
// The main idea is that both peers periodically create ecdh key pairs and exchange their public keys to create
// common key material. There are always two separate ecdh handshakes going on: one initiated by each peer.
// However, one handshake is always one step ahead of the other. That means that every message being sent contains a
// public key from step 1 of the handshake "proposed key" and a public key from step 2 of the handshake "confirmed
// key" (all messages except first message).
//
// When receiving a message from the peer, the node will create a new ecdh key pair and perform the key
// calculation for the proposed key. The peer will store the public key for the confirmation as pending to be
// confirmed in the next cycle. Also, if the message contains a confirmation (all but the very first message do),
// the node will use the stored private key to perform the ecdh key calculation and emit that key to be used in
// the crypto stream.
//
// Upon each cycle, a node first checks if it still has a proposed key that has not been confirmed by the remote
// peer. If so, a message must have been lost and the whole last message including the proposed key as well as the
// last confirmed key is being resent. If no proposed key is stored, the node will create a new ecdh key pair, and
// store the private key as proposed key. It then sends out a message containing the public key as proposal, as
// well as confirming the pending key. This key is also emitted to be added to the crypto stream but not to be
// used for encrypting.
//
// Monotonically increasing message ids guard the communication from message duplication and also serve as
// identifiers for the keys to be used in the crypto stream. Since the keys are rotating, the last 2 bits of the
// id are enough to identify the key.
//
// The whole communication is sent via the crypto stream and is therefore encrypted and protected against tampering.
use super::{Error, Key, MsgBuffer};
use byteorder::{NetworkEndian, ReadBytesExt, WriteBytesExt};

View File

@ -206,6 +206,7 @@ impl<D: Device, P: Protocol, S: Socket, TS: TimeSource> GenericCloud<D, P, S, TS
#[inline]
fn send_to(&mut self, addr: SocketAddr, msg: &mut MsgBuffer) -> Result<(), Error> {
// HOT PATH
debug!("Sending msg with {} bytes to {}", msg.len(), addr);
self.traffic.count_out_traffic(addr, msg.len());
match self.socket.send(msg.message(), addr) {
@ -217,6 +218,7 @@ impl<D: Device, P: Protocol, S: Socket, TS: TimeSource> GenericCloud<D, P, S, TS
#[inline]
fn send_msg(&mut self, addr: SocketAddr, type_: u8, msg: &mut MsgBuffer) -> Result<(), Error> {
// HOT PATH
debug!("Sending msg with {} bytes to {}", msg.len(), addr);
let peer = match self.peers.get_mut(&addr) {
Some(peer) => peer,
@ -614,15 +616,18 @@ impl<D: Device, P: Protocol, S: Socket, TS: TimeSource> GenericCloud<D, P, S, TS
}
pub fn handle_interface_data(&mut self, data: &mut MsgBuffer) -> Result<(), Error> {
// HOT PATH
let (src, dst) = P::parse(data.message())?;
debug!("Read data from interface: src: {}, dst: {}, {} bytes", src, dst, data.len());
self.traffic.count_out_payload(dst, src, data.len());
match self.table.lookup(dst) {
Some(addr) => {
// HOT PATH
// Peer found for destination
debug!("Found destination for {} => {}", dst, addr);
self.send_msg(addr, MESSAGE_TYPE_DATA, data)?;
if !self.peers.contains_key(&addr) {
// COLD PATH
// If the peer is not actually connected, remove the entry in the table and try
// to reconnect.
warn!("Destination for {} not found in peers: {}", dst, addr_nice(addr));
@ -631,6 +636,7 @@ impl<D: Device, P: Protocol, S: Socket, TS: TimeSource> GenericCloud<D, P, S, TS
}
}
None => {
// COLD PATH
if self.broadcast {
debug!("No destination for {} found, broadcasting", dst);
self.broadcast_msg(MESSAGE_TYPE_DATA, data)?;
@ -727,6 +733,7 @@ impl<D: Device, P: Protocol, S: Socket, TS: TimeSource> GenericCloud<D, P, S, TS
}
fn handle_payload_from(&mut self, peer: SocketAddr, data: &mut MsgBuffer) -> Result<(), Error> {
// HOT PATH
let (src, dst) = P::parse(data.message())?;
let len = data.len();
debug!("Writing data to device: {} bytes", len);
@ -745,11 +752,17 @@ impl<D: Device, P: Protocol, S: Socket, TS: TimeSource> GenericCloud<D, P, S, TS
fn handle_message(
&mut self, src: SocketAddr, msg_result: MessageResult<NodeInfo>, data: &mut MsgBuffer
) -> Result<(), Error> {
// HOT PATH
match msg_result {
MessageResult::Message(type_) => {
// HOT PATH
match type_ {
MESSAGE_TYPE_DATA => self.handle_payload_from(src, data)?,
MESSAGE_TYPE_DATA => {
// HOT PATH
self.handle_payload_from(src, data)?
}
MESSAGE_TYPE_NODE_INFO => {
// COLD PATH
let info = match NodeInfo::decode(Cursor::new(data.message())) {
Ok(val) => val,
Err(err) => {
@ -759,31 +772,50 @@ impl<D: Device, P: Protocol, S: Socket, TS: TimeSource> GenericCloud<D, P, S, TS
};
self.update_peer_info(src, Some(info))?
}
MESSAGE_TYPE_KEEPALIVE => self.update_peer_info(src, None)?,
MESSAGE_TYPE_CLOSE => self.remove_peer(src),
MESSAGE_TYPE_KEEPALIVE => {
// COLD PATH
self.update_peer_info(src, None)?
}
MESSAGE_TYPE_CLOSE => {
// COLD PATH
self.remove_peer(src)
}
_ => {
// COLD PATH
self.traffic.count_invalid_protocol(data.len());
return Err(Error::Message("Unknown message type"))
}
}
}
MessageResult::Initialized(info) => self.add_new_peer(src, info)?,
MessageResult::Initialized(info) => {
// COLD PATH
self.add_new_peer(src, info)?
}
MessageResult::InitializedWithReply(info) => {
// COLD PATH
self.add_new_peer(src, info)?;
self.send_to(src, data)?
}
MessageResult::Reply => self.send_to(src, data)?,
MessageResult::None => ()
MessageResult::Reply => {
// COLD PATH
self.send_to(src, data)?
}
MessageResult::None => {
// COLD PATH
}
}
Ok(())
}
pub fn handle_net_message(&mut self, src: SocketAddr, data: &mut MsgBuffer) -> Result<(), Error> {
// HOT PATH
let src = mapped_addr(src);
debug!("Received {} bytes from {}", data.len(), src);
let msg_result = if let Some(init) = self.pending_inits.get_mut(&src) {
// COLD PATH
init.handle_message(data)
} else if is_init_message(data.message()) {
// COLD PATH
let mut result = None;
if let Some(peer) = self.peers.get_mut(&src) {
if peer.crypto.has_init() {
@ -815,15 +847,22 @@ impl<D: Device, P: Protocol, S: Socket, TS: TimeSource> GenericCloud<D, P, S, TS
}
}
} else if let Some(peer) = self.peers.get_mut(&src) {
// HOT PATH
peer.crypto.handle_message(data)
} else {
// COLD PATH
info!("Ignoring non-init message from unknown peer {}", addr_nice(src));
self.traffic.count_invalid_protocol(data.len());
return Ok(())
};
// HOT PATH
match msg_result {
Ok(val) => self.handle_message(src, val, data),
Ok(val) => {
// HOT PATH
self.handle_message(src, val, data)
},
Err(err) => {
// COLD PATH
self.traffic.count_invalid_protocol(data.len());
Err(err)
}
@ -837,10 +876,12 @@ impl<D: Device, P: Protocol, S: Socket, TS: TimeSource> GenericCloud<D, P, S, TS
}
fn handle_socket_event(&mut self, buffer: &mut MsgBuffer) {
// HOT PATH
let src = try_fail!(self.socket.receive(buffer), "Failed to read from network socket: {}");
self.traffic.count_in_traffic(src, buffer.len());
match self.handle_net_message(src, buffer) {
Err(e @ Error::CryptoInitFatal(_)) => {
// COLD PATH
debug!("Fatal crypto init error from {}: {}", src, e);
info!("Closing pending connection to {} due to error in crypto init", addr_nice(src));
self.pending_inits.remove(&src);
@ -851,17 +892,20 @@ impl<D: Device, P: Protocol, S: Socket, TS: TimeSource> GenericCloud<D, P, S, TS
);
}
Err(e @ Error::CryptoInit(_)) => {
// COLD PATH
debug!("Recoverable init error from {}: {}", src, e);
info!("Ignoring invalid init message from peer {}", addr_nice(src));
}
Err(e) => {
// COLD PATH
error!("{}", e);
}
Ok(_) => {}
Ok(_) => {} // HOT PATH
}
}
fn handle_device_event(&mut self, buffer: &mut MsgBuffer) {
// HOT PATH
try_fail!(self.device.read(buffer), "Failed to read from device: {}");
if let Err(e) = self.handle_interface_data(buffer) {
error!("{}", e);
@ -882,8 +926,10 @@ impl<D: Device, P: Protocol, S: Socket, TS: TimeSource> GenericCloud<D, P, S, TS
let mut poll_error = false;
self.config.call_hook("vpn_started", vec![("IFNAME", self.device.ifname())], true);
for evt in waiter {
// HOT PATH
match evt {
WaitResult::Error(err) => {
// COLD PATH
if poll_error {
fail!("Poll wait failed again: {}", err);
}
@ -895,6 +941,7 @@ impl<D: Device, P: Protocol, S: Socket, TS: TimeSource> GenericCloud<D, P, S, TS
WaitResult::Device => self.handle_device_event(&mut buffer)
}
if self.next_housekeep < TS::now() {
// COLD PATH
poll_error = false;
if ctrlc.was_pressed() {
break

View File

@ -2,13 +2,10 @@
// Copyright (C) 2015-2020 Dennis Schwerdel
// This software is licensed under GPL-3 or newer (see LICENSE.md)
#![cfg_attr(feature = "bench", feature(test))]
#[macro_use] extern crate log;
#[macro_use] extern crate serde;
#[cfg(test)] extern crate tempfile;
#[cfg(feature = "bench")] extern crate test;
#[macro_use]
pub mod util;

View File

@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ use std::{
use super::util::{MockTimeSource, MsgBuffer, Time, TimeSource};
pub fn mapped_addr(addr: SocketAddr) -> SocketAddr {
// HOT PATH
match addr {
SocketAddr::V4(addr4) => SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V6(addr4.ip().to_ipv6_mapped()), addr4.port()),
_ => addr
@ -133,18 +134,3 @@ impl Socket for MockSocket {
Ok(self.address)
}
}
#[cfg(feature = "bench")]
mod bench {
use std::net::{Ipv4Addr, SocketAddrV4, UdpSocket};
use test::Bencher;
#[bench]
fn udp_send(b: &mut Bencher) {
let sock = UdpSocket::bind("127.0.0.1:0").unwrap();
let data = [0; 1400];
let addr = SocketAddrV4::new(Ipv4Addr::new(127, 0, 0, 1), 1);
b.iter(|| sock.send_to(&data, &addr).unwrap());
b.bytes = 1400;
}
}

View File

@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ impl Protocol for Frame {
/// # Errors
/// This method will fail when the given data is not a valid ethernet frame.
fn parse(data: &[u8]) -> Result<(Address, Address), Error> {
// HOT PATH
let mut cursor = Cursor::new(data);
let mut src = [0; 16];
let mut dst = [0; 16];
@ -77,26 +78,6 @@ fn decode_invalid_frame() {
assert!(Frame::parse(&[6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 0x81, 0x00]).is_err());
}
#[cfg(feature = "bench")]
mod bench_ethernet {
use super::*;
use test::Bencher;
#[bench]
fn decode_ethernet(b: &mut Bencher) {
let data = [6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8];
b.iter(|| Frame::parse(&data).unwrap());
b.bytes = 1400;
}
#[bench]
fn decode_ethernet_with_vlan(b: &mut Bencher) {
let data = [6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 0x81, 0, 4, 210, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8];
b.iter(|| Frame::parse(&data).unwrap());
b.bytes = 1400;
}
}
/// An IP packet dissector
///
/// This dissector is able to extract the source and destination ip addresses of ipv4 packets and
@ -110,6 +91,7 @@ impl Protocol for Packet {
/// # Errors
/// This method will fail when the given data is not a valid ipv4 and ipv6 packet.
fn parse(data: &[u8]) -> Result<(Address, Address), Error> {
// HOT PATH
if data.is_empty() {
return Err(Error::Parse("Empty header"))
}
@ -177,27 +159,3 @@ fn decode_invalid_packet() {
])
.is_err());
}
#[cfg(feature = "bench")]
mod bench_ip {
use super::*;
use test::Bencher;
#[bench]
fn decode_ipv4(b: &mut Bencher) {
let data = [0x40, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 192, 168, 1, 1, 192, 168, 1, 2];
b.iter(|| Packet::parse(&data).unwrap());
b.bytes = 1400;
}
#[bench]
fn decode_ipv6(b: &mut Bencher) {
let data = [
0x60, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 0, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1, 6,
5, 4, 3, 2, 1
];
b.iter(|| Packet::parse(&data).unwrap());
b.bytes = 1400;
}
}

View File

@ -41,9 +41,14 @@ impl<TS: TimeSource> ClaimTable<TS> {
}
pub fn cache(&mut self, addr: Address, peer: SocketAddr) {
// HOT PATH
self.cache.insert(addr, CacheValue { peer, timeout: TS::now() + self.cache_timeout as Time });
}
pub fn clear_cache(&mut self) {
self.cache.clear()
}
pub fn set_claims(&mut self, peer: SocketAddr, mut claims: RangeList) {
for entry in &mut self.claims {
if entry.peer == peer {
@ -85,9 +90,11 @@ impl<TS: TimeSource> ClaimTable<TS> {
}
pub fn lookup(&mut self, addr: Address) -> Option<SocketAddr> {
// HOT PATH
if let Some(entry) = self.cache.get(&addr) {
return Some(entry.peer)
}
// COLD PATH
let mut found = None;
let mut prefix_len = -1;
for entry in &self.claims {
@ -149,36 +156,3 @@ impl<TS: TimeSource> ClaimTable<TS> {
}
// TODO: test
#[cfg(feature = "bench")]
mod bench {
use super::*;
use crate::util::MockTimeSource;
use smallvec::smallvec;
use std::str::FromStr;
use test::Bencher;
#[bench]
fn lookup_warm(b: &mut Bencher) {
let mut table = ClaimTable::<MockTimeSource>::new(60, 60);
let addr = Address::from_str("1.2.3.4").unwrap();
table.cache(addr, SocketAddr::from_str("1.2.3.4:3210").unwrap());
b.iter(|| table.lookup(addr));
b.bytes = 1400;
}
#[bench]
fn lookup_cold(b: &mut Bencher) {
let mut table = ClaimTable::<MockTimeSource>::new(60, 60);
let addr = Address::from_str("1.2.3.4").unwrap();
table.set_claims(SocketAddr::from_str("1.2.3.4:3210").unwrap(), smallvec![
Range::from_str("1.2.3.4/32").unwrap()
]);
b.iter(|| {
table.cache.clear();
table.lookup(addr)
});
b.bytes = 1400;
}
}

View File

@ -83,21 +83,25 @@ pub struct TrafficStats {
impl TrafficStats {
#[inline]
pub fn count_out_traffic(&mut self, peer: SocketAddr, bytes: usize) {
// HOT PATH
self.peers.entry(peer).or_insert_with(TrafficEntry::default).count_out(bytes);
}
#[inline]
pub fn count_in_traffic(&mut self, peer: SocketAddr, bytes: usize) {
// HOT PATH
self.peers.entry(peer).or_insert_with(TrafficEntry::default).count_in(bytes);
}
#[inline]
pub fn count_out_payload(&mut self, remote: Address, local: Address, bytes: usize) {
// HOT PATH
self.payload.entry((remote, local)).or_insert_with(TrafficEntry::default).count_out(bytes);
}
#[inline]
pub fn count_in_payload(&mut self, remote: Address, local: Address, bytes: usize) {
// HOT PATH
self.payload.entry((remote, local)).or_insert_with(TrafficEntry::default).count_in(bytes);
}